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Abstract 
The n–2 repetition cost seen in task switching is the effect of slower response times 
performing a recently completed task (e.g. an ABA sequence) compared to performing a task 
that was not recently completed (e.g. a CBA sequence). This cost is thought to reflect 
cognitive inhibition of task representations and has been well replicated (Koch, Gade, 
Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). As such, the n–2 repetition cost has started to be used as a measure 
of individual differences in inhibitory control (e.g. Whitmer & Banich, 2007); however, the 
reliability of this measure has not been investigated in a systematic manner. The current study 
addressed this important issue. Seventy-two participants performed three task switching 
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paradigms; participants were also assessed on rumination traits and processing speed—
measures of individual differences potentially modulating the n–2 repetition cost. We found 
significant n–2 repetition costs for each paradigm. However, split-half reliability tests 
revealed that this cost was not reliable at the individual-difference level. Neither rumination 
tendencies nor processing speed predicted this cost. We conclude that the n–2 repetition cost 
is not reliable as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control. 
Keywords: task switching, n–2 repetition cost, backward inhibition, reliability 
 
Inhibition in Task Switching: The Reliability of the N–2 Repetition Cost 
Our ability to perform efficient task switching can be taken for granted, given the ease 
with which we are able to do it; for example, when writing a manuscript, one can alternate 
between writing and reading previously prepared notes, answering the phone, and surfing the 
internet. However, what may seem an effortless behaviour arises because of mental processes 
working together, ultimately resulting in humans being able to behave in a goal-directed and 
context-appropriate manner. For goal-oriented behaviour to be effective, one has to be able to 
attend to relevant information and ignore irrelevant information (e.g. ignoring social media 
notifications when working on a manuscript). The mental processes coordinating the ability 
to maintain context-relevant behaviour and change it when necessary are not fully 
understood, but it seems they are part of a dynamic system (Goschke, 2000), a system by 
which behaviour is adapted in a moment-to-moment manner, by activating relevant- and 
inhibiting irrelevant-dimensions of a given task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
In the laboratory, researchers use the so-called task switching paradigm to assess the 
efficiency with which switching is performed; data from these paradigms (e.g. reaction times, 
RT; accuracy) are used to make inferences about candidate mental processes associated with 
switching (see Grange & Houghton, 2014; Kiesel et al., 2010;  and Vandierendonck, 
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Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010, for recent reviews on task switching). Task switching 
paradigms typically require participants to make rapid responses to stimuli presented 
sequentially. For example, participants might be presented with numerical stimuli and be 
asked to perform tasks such as judging whether the number is odd/even (a parity judgment), 
lower/higher than 5 (a magnitude judgment), or whether it is in red/blue font (a colour 
judgment). 
One cognitive process thought to aid task switching performance is the inhibition of 
recently performed task-sets (i.e., the mental representation required to perform a task; Mayr 
& Keele, 2000). Evidence for inhibition in task switching comes from the backward 
inhibition paradigm, where participants are required to switch between three tasks. 
Experiments using this paradigm show that people are slower and less accurate performing a 
task that was performed recently (i.e., an ABA sequence) compared to performing a task that 
was not performed recently (i.e., a CBA sequence; where A, B, and C are arbitrary labels for 
tasks). This effect—known as the n–2 repetition cost—is interpreted as evidence for 
inhibitory control (Gade, Schuch, Druey, & Koch, 2014; Koch et al., 2010; Mayr & Keele 
2000): It is thought to reflect the persisting inhibition applied to task A when it was switched 
away from in preference for task B in an ABA sequence. The n–2 repetition cost has been 
replicated in a number of different studies and—to date—seems resistant to non–inhibitory 
accounts (Koch et al., 2010; Mayr, 2007). 
Much is known about the characteristics of the n–2 repetition cost and how it relates 
to cognitive inhibition (see Gade et al., 2014, for a recent review). As such, the paradigm has 
become of interest to researchers wishing to explore cognitive inhibition more widely. For 
example, researchers have used the n–2 repetition cost to assess inhibitory control from a 
variety of approaches, including the effect of brain lesions (Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & 
Keele, 2006), neuroimaging (Dreher, Kohn, & Berman, 2001; Whitmer & Banich, 2012), 
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healthy ageing (Lawo, Philipp, Schuch, & Koch, 2012; Mayr, 2001), Parkinson’s disease 
(Fales et al., 2006); Williams’ syndrome (Foti et al., 2015), obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Moritz, Hübner, & Kluwe, 2004), major-depressive disorder (Whitmer & Banich, 2012), 
pathological gambling (Yiu-kwan, 2008), bilingualism (Philipp & Koch, 2009; Prior, 2012), 
and mindfulness (Greenberg, Reiner, & Meiran, 2013).  
The n–2 repetition cost has also been utilised to assess individual differences in 
inhibitory control by relating it to other variables. For example, Whitmer and Banich (2007) 
found a negative correlation between the n–2 repetition cost and the tendency to engage in 
depressive rumination. In unpublished work, Grange (2010) found no correlation between n–
2 repetition costs and working memory capacity, as measured by the automated operation-
span task (Unsworth, Heitz, & Engle, 2005). In another study—although not their primary 
focus—Grange and Juvina (2015) presented data from individual subjects on the effect of 
practice on the n–2 repetition cost. These data showed considerable within- and between-
subject variation in the magnitude of the n–2 repetition cost and its reduction with practice. 
  
The Current Study 
 As the n–2 repetition cost garners wider attention as a tool to study cognitive 
inhibition, it becomes important to assess its psychometric properties (Drost, 2011; 
Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). Although well replicated, no one has yet provided a 
systematic assessment of the internal reliability of the n–2 repetition cost; we sought to 
provide some information regarding this in the current study. Some measures commonly used 
to assess individual differences in cognitive/inhibitory control have been shown to be reliable 
(stop-signal task: Congdon et al., 2012; go/no-go task: Leue, Klein, Lange, & Beauducel, 
2013; Stroop test: Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005). However, other measures 
appear to have low reliability (e.g., the negative priming effect; Bestgen & Dupont, 2000).  
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To our knowledge, there is only one study that has partially addressed the reliability 
of the n–2 repetition cost; Pettigrew and Martin (2015)—amongst other results—reported the 
reliability of the n–2 repetition cost as low (Spearman-Brown corrected correlation 
coefficient .44–.51). For a given measure to be considered reliable, its Spearman-Brown 
correlation coefficient must be at least .7 (Cronbach, 1951). The finding that the n–2 
repetition cost has a low reliability is an indication that this effect should be interpreted with 
caution when used as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control (e.g., Whitmer 
& Banich, 2007). 
In the current study, we wished to examine in a systematic manner the reliability of 
the n–2 repetition cost. Participants performed three versions of the task switching paradigm, 
similar to paradigms used in published research on the n–2 repetition cost: The “Target 
Detection” paradigm (similar to Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009, Experiment 3) the 
“Visual Judgment” paradigm (similar to Gade & Koch, 2008); and the “Numeric Judgment” 
paradigm (similar to Schuch & Koch, 2003). These paradigms differed according to task 
cues, stimuli, and response requirements, thus allowing some generalisations of the findings. 
Exposing participants to three paradigms allowed us to explore the internal reliability of each 
paradigm, but also to explore for the first time the correlation of n–2 repetition cost between 
paradigms. We also measured depressive rumination (shown to modulate the n–2 repetition 
cost; Whitmer & Banich, 2007) and general processing speed as potential controls during the 
reliability analysis. To anticipate the results, we find that the n–2 repetition cost across all 
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The Ethical Research Panel at Keele University approved the study. Participants were 
first year Psychology students from Keele University, and participated in exchange for partial 
course credit. Participants were required to be at least 18 years old, understand spoken and 
written English, and to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Our sample size was determined using the R package “pwr” (Champely, 2009), using 
the expected effect size of the reliability measure. As explained later, we used a form of split-
half reliability to assess reliability. The criterion for reliability relates to a Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient of r ≈ .54. Using this expected effect size, and a desired 
power of 95%, the required sample size was 38. However, to be conservative, we reduced our 
expected correlation coefficient to r = 0.4, which for power of 95% requires 75 participants. 
We used this as our intended sample size.  
Ninety-four participants were recruited. Twenty-two participants were removed: 
fourteen due to accuracy being lower than an a priori defined criterion of 90% in at least one 
of the task switching paradigms; seven due to incomplete data (attending only one session out 
of two); and one due to unusually large n–2 repetition benefit (> 700 milliseconds, ms). The 
final sample consisted of 72 participants (60 females; mean age = 18.76, SD = 1.07). Note 
this is three below our intended sample size, but still maintains more than 94% power. 
 
General Procedure 
Participants attended two sessions each lasting 45 minutes (1–8 days apart, M = 3.10, 
SD = 2.30) during which they performed three task switching paradigms, a processing speed 
task, and filled in a rumination tendencies-questionnaire. The order of all of the components 
was counterbalanced across participants. Each session started either with an administration of 
the questionnaire or the processing speed task (which alternated across participants); the three 
task switching paradigms were counterbalanced with a Latin Square Design (3x3). The task 
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switching paradigms were presented on a standard PC with a 17in. monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Responses were made on a 1-ms 
precise USB keyboard. 
Before performing each task switching paradigm, participants had a practice 
consisting of 16 trials, which was repeated once if four or more errors were made. No further 
practice was allowed. During the practice, if an incorrect response was made, the word 
‘Error’ (font the Courier New, size 18) appeared on the screen for 1000ms. 
The trial structure for each task switching paradigm was the same. First, a cue was 
presented for 500ms, followed by the stimulus that stayed on the screen for the duration it 
took participants to make a response. Participants learned the cue–task pairings before the 
practice phase. The cue remained on the screen during stimulus presentation. Once a response 
was recorded, the cue for the next trial appeared 100ms later (response–cue interval). 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants 
performed four blocks of 120 trials each. However, due to a coding error, the Target 
Detection paradigm only presented 360 trials1. Trials were presented in a random order with 
the constraint that immediate task repetitions were not allowed; this was because immediate 
repetitions decrease the magnitude of the n–2 repetition cost (Philipp & Koch, 2006). Trials 
were classified as ABA or CBA sequences by comparing the current task requirement to that 
at n–2. An overview of the trial structure for each paradigm is shown in Figure 1.  
 
***Insert Figure 1 Here*** 
 
Task Switching Paradigms 
                                                            
1Additional analysis limited to the first 360 trials per paradigm was also conducted, to examine to what extent 
unequal number of trials in task switching paradigms affected the results. Differences from additional analyses 
are reported in footnotes. 
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The Target Detection paradigm. This paradigm was based on the procedure of 
Houghton, Pritchard, and Grange (2009), Experiment 3, and required participants to make 
spatial localisation judgments of stimuli (Mayr & Keele, 2000).  
The cues were shapes (triangle, square, octagon; height and width 4 cm) and targets 
were oval shapes of different characteristics (see Figure 1). All ovals had a height of 6 cm; 
three ovals had widths of 2.3 cm, and one oval had a width of 3.5 cm. Cues and stimuli were 
presented in grayscale shading on a white background. Participants were required to respond 
to the location of the target associated with the presented cue. For all participants, the square 
cue was associated with the “shaded” target, the triangle cue was associated with the 
“bordered” target, and the octagon cue was associated with the “angled” target. The cue 
appeared in the centre of the screen, followed by four oval shapes (three possible targets and 
one distractor), with one oval centred within each quadrant of the screen.  The position of the 
targets on the stimulus display was randomised.  
Participants responded to the location of the correct target by pressing one of four 
possible response keys, depending on the location of the correct target. Each key 
corresponded to one corner of the screen: upper left-D, lower left-C, lower right-N, upper 
right-J. Participants used their index and middle fingers of both hands to respond with; 
middle fingers on D/J, and index fingers on C/N. 
The Visual Judgments paradigm. This paradigm is based on the procedure of Gade 
and Koch (2008). Participants made judgments about the visual characteristic of a single 
multivalent stimulus. The stimulus on each trial was either the letter “A” or the number “4”, 
in either red or blue font; it could also be large or small. Participants were required to judge 
whether the stimulus was a digit or a number (a form task), small or large (0.5cm vs. 1cm; a 
size task), or whether it was red or blue (a colour task).  
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 The stimulus appeared in the centre of a white rectangle (4 cm high x 3.5 cm wide) 
and a task was cued by four cues of one type presented around the rectangle; each cue centred 
to each side of the rectangle. The cue was the $ sign (1 cm high) for the judgment of ‘form’, 
arrows pointing up and down (1 cm high) for the judgment of ‘size’, and yellow squares (1 x 
1 cm) for the judgement of the colour task. Participants responded with their index fingers by 
pressing one of two keys: “Z” for a “blue”, “small”, or “letter” response, and “M” for a “red”, 
“large”, or “digit” response. 
The Numeric Judgments paradigm. This paradigm used the type of stimuli 
previously used by Schuch and Koch (2003), with central/peripheral judgment replaced by 
the word/digit judgment. The stimulus presented on each trial was either a digit (1, 2 ,3 ,4 ,6 
,7 ,8 ,9) or a number word (one, two, three, four, six, seven, eight, nine). Participants were 
required to judge whether the stimulus was odd or even (a parity judgment), whether it was 
lower or higher than five (a magnitude judgment), or judge whether the stimulus was in digit 
or word form (a form judgment). Task cues were the words “parity”, “magnitude”, and 
“form”. Both, the cue and the stimulus were presented on the screen in black, Courier New, 
size 24 font on a grey background.  The cue was presented above a central fixation cross, and 
the stimulus was presented below fixation (see Figure 1). Participants responded with their 
index fingers by pressing one of two keys: “Z” for an “odd”, “lower than five”, or “word” 
response, and “M” for an “even”, “higher than five”, or “digit” response. 
 
Materials 
The processing speed task. The processing speed task was used to assess the rate at 
which participants processed information; the test used was an adaptation of the Digit 
Symbol  Substitution Task (e.g. van der Elst, van Boxtel, van Breukelen, & Jolles, 2006). 
This factor has not been directly linked to the n–2 repetition cost, but processing speed is 
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known to predict overall cognitive abilities (Brown, Brockmole, Gow, & Deary, 2012; 
Stawski, Sliwinski, & Hofer, 2013), so we wished to potentially control for it.  
Participants were presented with nine digit-letter pairs on a sheet of paper; beneath the 
number-letter pairings was a list of digits; participants were required to write the letter that 
corresponded to each digit. Participants were given 120 seconds to match as many pairs of 
letters with numbers as possible. Participants practiced this task with seven pairs; after the 
practice they matched the rest of the pairs in a sequential manner, without skipping any 
numbers; they could correct a mistake but could not erase their answers (responses were 
written with a pencil). The total score is the number of correct matches (maximum 133), with 
higher scores reflecting more efficient processing speed.  
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). Ruminative tendencies were assessed with 
the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) – short version, consisting of ten questions, including 
the Brooding and Reflection parts (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). This 
version has been shown to be reliable (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Thanoi & Klainin-
Yobas, 2015; Whitmer & Banich, 2007).  
 Participants answered the following question “…how often you do things described in 
each statement” in relation to ten different statements (e.g. Think ‘What I am doing to deserve 
this’?). Participants responded as to what extent they felt the statements applied to them, 
using a 1–4 scale, where 1 corresponded to “almost never” and 4 corresponded to “almost 
always”. The RRS scores were obtained by summing the answers participants circled; the 
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The current study employed a within-subjects design. The dependent variables were 
RTs and accuracy, and the independent variables were task sequence (ABA vs. CBA) and 
paradigm (Target Detection vs. Visual Judgment vs. Numeric Judgment).  To perform 
regression between n–2 repetition cost, depressive rumination, and processing speed, 
predictors were the RRS questionnaire and processing speed test scores and the dependent 








For the task switching data, we removed the first two trials of each block. For 
response time analysis, we removed error trials and the two trials following an error; this 
trimming led to 6% trials being removed (4.6% from the Target Detection paradigm, 5.7% 
from the Visual Judgment paradigm, and 7.4% from the Numeric Judgment paradigm). Both 
of these removals were due to the inability to classify the current trial as an ABA or CBA 
sequence. After the error trimming, we further trimmed response times by removing RTs 
faster than 150ms, and RTs slower than 2.5 standard deviations above each participant’s 
mean for each cell of the experimental design. In total, the accuracy and RT trimming led to 
11.7 % of trials being removed (9.9 % for the Target Detection paradigm, 11.3% for the 
Visual Judgment paradigm, and 13.7% for the Numeric Judgment paradigm).  
 
Standard N–2 Repetition Cost Analysis 
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Before conducting the reliability analysis, we performed standard n–2 repetition cost 
analysis to assess whether the n–2 repetition cost was present in each paradigm. Additionally, 
we took this opportunity to assess whether the magnitude of the n–2 repetition cost varies 
reliably across the different paradigms. Mean response times and accuracy for each level of 
the design are presented in Table 1.  
 
***Insert Table 1 here*** 
 
Response time analysis. We submitted the response times to a 2x3 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a main effect of sequence, F(1, 71) = 108.98, 
p<.001, ηg2 = .02, as participants were slower performing ABA sequences (M = 1212, SE = 
102) compared to CBA sequences (M = 1120, SE = 98). There was a main effect of 
paradigm, F(2, 142) = 61.19, p<.001, ηg2 = .16, as participants were fastest performing the 
Target Detection paradigm (M = 968, SE = 76) followed by the Visual Judgement paradigm 
(M = 1230, SE = 103), and the Numeric Judgement paradigm (M = 1276, SE = 113). There 
was no interaction between sequence and paradigm, F(2, 142) = 0.67, p=.51, ηg2 < .001, 
suggesting equivalent n–2 repetition costs across the three paradigms. The n–2 repetition cost 
was significant for the Target Detection paradigm, t(71) = 8.50, p<.001, 95%CI = [69, 111], 
for the Visual Judgement paradigm, t(71) = 9.12, p<.001, 95%CI = [82, 128], and for the 
Numeric Judgment paradigm, t(71) = 5.31, p<.001, 95%CI = [54, 119]. See Figure 2 for 
density functions of the distributions of n–2 repetition cost across each paradigm for response 
times. 
 
***Insert Figure 2 here*** 
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Accuracy analysis. We submitted accuracy to a 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA. 
There was a main effect of sequence, F(1,71) = 10.22, p<.01, ηg2 = .01, as participants were 
more accurate in CBA sequences (M = 97.22, SE = 0.27) compared to ABA sequences (M = 
96.80, SE = 0.25). There was also a main effect of paradigm, F(2, 142) = 19.07, p<.001, ηg2 
= .07, as participants were most accurate performing the Target Detection paradigm (M = 
97.66, SE = 0.22) followed by the Visual Judgment paradigm (M = 97.10, SE = 0.24), and 
the Numeric Judgment paradigm (M = 96.27, SE = 0.30). There was also an interaction 
between sequence and the paradigm, F(2,142) = 4.01, p<.05, ηg2 = .008. The n–2 repetition 
cost was significant for the Target Detection paradigm, t(71) = -4.71, p<.001, 95%CI = [-
1.31, -0.53], but it was not significant for the Visual Judgement paradigm, t(71) = -1.42, 
p=.16, 95%CI = [-0.78, 0.13] or for the Numeric Judgment paradigm, t(71) = -0.01, p=.99, 
95%CI = [-0.52, 0.52]. See Figure 3 for density functions of the distributions of n–2 
repetition cost across each paradigm for accuracy. 
 
*** Insert Figure 3 here*** 
 
Overall Performance Correlations 
We first performed Pearson product-moment correlation analysis on overall (i.e., 
mean) RT and accuracy to assess whether overall participant performance was stable across 
all three paradigms. These overall measures were also used as input into some of the 
individual differences analysis reported below, so we report them here for completeness.  
Reaction time. The mean RT for the Target Detection paradigm correlated 
significantly with the Numeric Judgment paradigm (r = .64, p< .001) and the Visual 
Judgment paradigm (r = .68, p <.001); the Numeric Judgment paradigm correlated with the 
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Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .75, p <.001). All of these correlations remain significant 
when controlling for multiple comparisons (see Table 2).  
Accuracy. Overall accuracy on the Target Detection paradigm correlated significantly 
with the Numeric Judgment (r = .42, p<.001), and the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .50, p 
< .001); the Numeric Judgment correlated significantly with the Visual Judgment paradigm (r 
= .63, p < .001). All of these correlations remain significant when controlling for multiple 
comparisons (see Table 3). 
 
***Insert Table 2 here*** 
***Insert Table 3 here*** 
 
            
Individual Differences Analysis 
In this section, we report those analyses involving processing speed and rumination 
measures. The mean score on the processing speed test was 91.41 (SD = 12.78, min. = 66, 
max. = 121)2, and the mean score on the RRS questionnaire was 19.04 (SD = 5.00, min. = 11, 
max. = 37). These two measures did not correlate (Table 2).  
The mean RTs on the three paradigms were significantly negatively correlated with 
the processing speed score (Numeric Judgment, r = -.49, p<.001; Target Detection, r = -0.63, 
p< .001; the Visual Judgment, r = -.49, p < .001). This presents a form of manipulation check 
of our measures, as it suggests our measure of processing speed was successful. The RRS 
score did not correlate with the mean RTs on the three task switching paradigms. 
                                                            
2 One participant had missing data for the Processing Speed measure; to maintain power, we kept this participant 
and imputed their value using the mean score for the Processing Speed test. Removing this participant changes 
none of the conclusions. 
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Multiple regression analyses revealed that the response time n–2 repetition cost was 
not predicted by either the RRS score or the processing speed score in any of the three task 
switching paradigms (see Table 4)3. As n–2 repetition cost was not predicted by the 
individual differences, we did not control for these measures in the between-paradigm 
correlations or the reliability analysis reported below. 
 
***Insert Table 4 here*** 
 
Between-Paradigm Correlations of the N–2 Repetition Cost 
In the next phase of analysis, we wished to assess whether measures of the n–2 
repetition cost correlated between different task switching paradigms. To achieve this, we 
performed Pearson product-moment correlations on the n–2 repetition costs across all three 
paradigms separately for response times and accuracy. See Table 5 for the response time 
correlations, and Table 6 for the accuracy correlations. 
Response time. The Target Detection paradigm did not correlate with the Visual 
Judgment paradigm (r = .07, p = .57), but it correlated with the Numeric Judgment paradigm 
(r = .25, p = .036); the Visual Judgment paradigm correlated with the Numeric Judgment 
paradigm (r = .30, p=.01; see Table 5)4. Note, though, that these do not remain significant 
when using Bonferroni corrections for multiple correlations.  
 
***Insert Table 5 here*** 
                                                            
3Transforming RRS and the processing speed scores into z-scores and then inputting them into the regression 
analysis also yielded non-significant results. 
4 Equal trials correlation analysis: the n–2 repetition cost correlated only between the Visual and Numeric 
Judgments paradigms (r = .28, p = .01). The reported correlations remained unchanged when we controlled for 
individual differences in processing speed via partial correlations: Target Detection paradigm did not correlate 
with the Visual Judgement paradigm (r = .07, p = .56), but it did correlate with the Numeric Judgement 
paradigm (r = .25, p = .03); the Visual Judgement paradigm correlated with the Numeric Judgement paradigm (r 
= .30, p = .01). Note these latter correlations do not remain significant when using Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple correlations. 
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Accuracy. The Target Detection paradigm did not correlate with the Numeric 
Judgment (r = .06, p = .64), or the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = -.15, p = .22); also, the 
Numeric Judgment paradigm did not correlate with the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .01, p 
=.93; see Table 6).  
***Insert Table 6 here*** 
 
Reliability Analysis 
 We conducted split-half reliability analysis to assess the reliability of the n–2 
repetition cost in response times and accuracy. Unlike the test–retest procedure, the split-half 
method controls for practice effects, which is important for examining the n–2 repetition cost 
because it has been shown that practice reduces the n–2 repetition cost (Grange & Juvina, 
2015). It is also less time consuming, and it is therefore suitable for testing the reliability of 
cognitive tests (Drost, 2011). 
One potential disadvantage of the split-half method is that the method of split is often 
arbitrary (for example, splitting trials into odd and even numbered trials, and assessing the 
reliability of the DV between each half). The resulting reliability statistic is a point-estimate 
(i.e., a single value), and therefore there is no way of being sure whether the point estimate is 
an accurate estimate of the measure’s reliability, or whether it is specific to the splitting 
method used. 
To overcome this potential disadvantage, we performed a form of bootstrapping by 
conducting many random splits of the data and calculating a reliability estimate for each split 
(see e.g. Congdon et al., 2012). Specifically, for each paradigm and each participant, post-
trimming data were split randomly into two halves. Then, for each half, mean RTs for ABA 
and CBA sequences were calculated. This allowed us to calculate the n–2 repetition cost for 
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each half. Next, a Pearson product-moment correlation between the n–2 repetition cost from 
the two halves was conducted, and the point-estimate was stored. We repeated this procedure 
500 times, allowing for a distribution of correlation coefficients. 
 Splitting the data in half reduces the total number of data points being used in the 
reliability analysis, which can reduce the reliability coefficient. Therefore, it is typical to use 




1 + (ܰ − 1)ݎ										(1) 
 
where r is the Pearson product-moment coefficient and N is the number of “tests” being 
combined. In our case, we are combing two halves, so N = 2. The reliability of a given 
measure is considered as strong if rc is at least .7 (Cronbach, 1951; Picardi & Masick, 2013; 
Revelle & Condon, 2014). With N = 2, this pertains to an uncorrected r ≈ .5385. 
 Note that in our bootstrapping method, some (uncorrected) r values were negative, 
which indicates total lack of reliability, and renders the Spearman-Brown correction 
uninterpretable. As such, we report the uncorrected r below for the bootstrapping, but refer to 
rc when interpreting the full result. 
Response times. Figure 4 shows the reliability tests for the n–2 repetition cost in 
response times; it depicts a violin plot of the distribution of correlation coefficients for the 
split-half reliability for each of the three paradigms. A violin plot is like a standard box-plot, 
with the addition of a rotated density function of the distribution of scores, allowing a better 
description of the shape of the distributions.  
 
***Insert Figure 4 here*** 
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As can be seen, the peaks of all of the distributions fall short of the criterion for 
reliability (as stated, equivalent to an uncorrected r ≈ .5385); whilst the tails of the 
distributions for the Target Detection and the Numeric Judgement paradigm do cross the 
criterion, we do not consider this strong evidence for acceptable reliability. The median 
values of uncorrected correlation coefficients were: r = .35 for the Target Detection 
paradigm, r = .23 for the Visual Judgment paradigm, and r = .43 for the Numeric Judgment 
paradigm. These translate to corrected values of rc = .52 for the Target Detection paradigm, rc 
= .37 for the Visual Judgement paradigm, and rc = .60 for the Numeric Judgement paradigm. 
 Accuracy. Figure 5 shows the reliability tests for the n–2 repetition cost in the 
accuracy data. For all three paradigms, the whole of the reliability distribution is beneath the 
criterion for reliability. The median values of uncorrected correlation coefficients were: r = 
.07 for the Target Detection paradigm, r = .18 for the Visual Judgment paradigm, and r = .19 
for the Numeric Judgment paradigm. These translate to corrected values of rc = .13 for the 
Target Detection paradigm, rc = .31 for the Visual Judgement paradigm, and rc = .32 for the 
Numeric Judgement paradigm. 
 
***Insert Figure 5 here*** 
 
Exploratory analysis of the n–2 repetition cost: Practice effect. It could be argued 
that due to a relatively short practice period for each of our task switching paradigms, 
participant performance had not reached asymptote before the main experimental blocks 
commenced. If this is the case, the lack of reliability we have observed could be due to our 
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data not being reflective of optimum performance from participants5. In order to rule out this 
possibility, we conducted exploratory analysis where for each of the paradigms the first block 
of the data was removed before the split-half bootstrapping was conducted. To anticipate, the 
results were qualitatively identical with this control for practice. 
 Response times. The median values of correlation coefficients were r = .33 (rc = .50) 
for the Target Detection paradigm, r = .34 (rc = .51) for the Visual Judgment paradigm, and r 
= .39 (rc = .56) for the Numeric Judgement paradigm.  
Accuracy. The median values of correlation coefficients were r<.0001 (ݎ௖ = .001) for 
the Target Detection paradigm, r=.25 (ݎ௖ = .40) for the Visual Judgment paradigm, and r=.09 
(ݎ௖ = .17) for the Numeric Judgment paradigm.  
Exploratory analysis of the n–2 repetition cost: Ordering of paradigms. There 
was a possibility that the poor across-paradigm reliability was a result of a reduction in the n-
2 repetition cost as participants progressed through the experimental sessions6; due to the 
counterbalancing, this could mask reliability effects if not controlled.  
In order to address this potential issue, we re-categorised the n–2 repetition cost for 
reach participant as a function of “paradigm order” (i.e., “1st paradigm encountered”; “2nd 
paradigm encountered”; “3rd paradigm encountered”). We then conducted a one-way 
ANOVA with the n–2 repetition cost as a dependent variable and the paradigm order as the 
independent variable. This analysis revealed that there was no effect of order on the n–2 
repetition cost, F(2,142) = 0.22, p > .8, ηg2= .002 ; the 1st paradigm encountered had a mean 
n–2 repetition cost of 88ms (SE=13); the 2nd paradigm encountered had a mean n–2 repetition 
cost of 95ms (SE=13); and the 3rd paradigm encountered had a mean n–2 repetition cost of 
                                                            
5 We are grateful to Cai Longman for suggesting this possibility. 
6 We are grateful to Cai Longman for suggesting this possibility. 
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99ms (SE=13). Thus, there is no evidence to support a reduction in n–2 repetition cost as 
participants proceeded through the experiment. 
 
General Discussion 
The main aim of the current study was to examine the reliability of the n–2 repetition 
cost, a promising measure of individual differences in inhibitory control (e.g. Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007). Consistent with the existing literature, we found large and statistically-
significant n–2 repetition costs in all three task switching paradigms used in our study; 
however, the n–2 repetition cost was found to not be reliable in the split-half reliability 
analysis, and was not predicted by individual differences hypothesised to be associated with 
inhibition (i.e., RRS and processing speed). 
The current study’s findings confirmed the results from Pettigrew and Martin's (2015) 
study. These authors used the n–2 repetition cost as a component of a battery of tests used to 
investigate the extent to which individual variation in working memory capacity and 
interference resolution relates to task switching performance. As part of their study, they 
assessed the reliability of all of their methods using split-half reliability, and found the n–2 
repetition cost to be below the criterion for reliability. Assessing the reliability of this 
measure was not the primary aim of their study. Our study therefore provides the first 
systematic examination of the reliability of the n–2 repetition cost using three typical task 
switching paradigms. Importantly, as each paradigm in the current study had very different 
task demands, we are more confident that our findings can be generalised. 
Our findings present a challenge to researchers wishing to use the n–2 repetition cost 
for individual differences research, and opens the question as to the cognitive processes 
“captured” by the n–2 repetition cost; that is, whether the n–2 repetition cost is a measure of a 
single process (i.e., cognitive inhibition). If a given measure taps into a single process rather 
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than a number of different processes, that measure would be expected to be reliable (Streiner, 
2003). Grange and Juvina (2015) found considerable variation in the n–2 repetition cost of 
nine subjects in a practice study. Whilst not the focus of their investigation, Grange and 
Juvina modelled this individual variation by varying a parameter in their computational 
model that controlled inhibitory input; the model was able to reproduce this individual 
variation. However, the current findings suggest this individual variation is not reliable, 
making it harder to interpret. It is possible that as-yet unidentified factors (including 
individual difference predictors) not controlled for in the current study could have affected 
the reliability of the n–2 repetition cost. 
 
N–2 Repetition Costs Between Paradigms 
An additional feature of using more than one task switching paradigm is that we can 
assess the degree of correlation of n–2 repetition cost across all paradigms. We found that—
whilst the group-level n–2 repetition cost did not vary significantly across different 
paradigms—individual n–2 repetition costs did not correlate across paradigms. This is 
converging evidence as to the lack of reliability in the measure: That is, if the n–2 repetition 
cost is a reliable and accurate measure of an individual’s inhibitory control, then a participant 
with a large n–2 repetition cost in one paradigm should show similar n–2 repetition cost in a 
different paradigm. Therefore, the finding that the n–2 repetition cost only partially correlated 
between the three paradigms not only adds to the evidence that this effect is not reliable, but 
could be taken as evidence for the n–2 repetition cost not being as pure a measure of 
cognitive inhibition as currently believed. Future research should explore potential reasons 
for the apparent lack of reliability. 
 
Individual Differences and the N–2 Repetition Cost  
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It is an under-reported finding that typically the n–2 repetition cost varies 
considerably between participants (see Figure 2; see also Grange & Juvina, 2015). This 
individual variation has become of interest to some researchers. The current study aimed to 
account for known individual differences associated with the n–2 repetition cost, and control 
for these differences in the reliability analysis; these factors were found not to be associated 
with the n–2 repetition cost.  
Although not the primary focus of our research, our findings did not replicate the 
negative correlation between depressive rumination and the n–2 repetition cost reported by 
Whitmer and Banich (2007). Processing speed also did not predict the magnitude of the n–2 
repetition cost. The reason for our failure to replicate the negative correlation between 
depressive rumination and the n–2 repetition cost (Whitmer & Banich, 2007) is uncertain. 
Chen, Feng, Wang, Su, and Zhang (2016) also found no relationship between the n–2 
repetition cost and the level of ruminative tendencies, suggesting more work is required in 
this area to clarify the true relation between rumination and n–2 repetition costs. Whilst it is 
of course plausible our findings and those of Chen et al. reflect a genuine failure to replicate 
Whitmer and Banich’s results (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015), we believe 
methodological differences are a more likely candidate. For example, Whitmer and Banich’s 
Experiment 1 had a sample of forty-three participants selected from the upper and lower 10% 
of RRS scorers from 776 respondents. Thus, their participants were more “extreme” on the 
RRS scale than our participants, which could explain our discrepant findings. However, their 
Experiment 2 had fifty-four participants that were not pre-selected in this manner, and still 
found a negative correlation. We also note that they statistically controlled for the switch cost 
which we did not measure in our study; therefore, the difference in statistical control could 
also explain the discrepancy.   
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On the Choice of Reliability Criterion 
One reviewer raised the possibility that our chosen criterion for acceptable reliability 
of the n–2 repetition cost— a corrected reliability coefficient greater than .7 —was perhaps 
too stringent. We are sympathetic to this view because this is the criterion tailored for 
psychometric tests; experimental cognitive tasks such as the task switching paradigm are 
perhaps not optimised for individual difference measures. As such, it is perhaps unrealistic to 
expect this paradigm to reach high levels of reliability. 
However, we would like to emphasise that whilst we interpret our data as suggesting 
the n–2 repetition cost has low reliability, this does not preclude readers reaching different 
conclusions. Our bootstrapping data provide readers with the distribution of reliability 
coefficients, and we would advise the reader to use their own judgment on how to interpret 
these coefficients in terms of reliability.  There will likely be variation in these judgements. It 
is worth mentioning that the level of internal reliability of the n–2 repetition cost obtained 
from our study has been interpreted before as “moderate” (Leue, Klein, & Lange, 2013), 
“poor”-to-“good” (Condon et al., 2012), and “quite low” (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015). None 
of these are necessarily “correct”. 
 
Low Reliability Due to Homogenous Sample? 
There is a possibility that the homogenous sample used in the current study might 
have reduced the differential validity by reducing the variance of the n–2 repetition cost, in 
turn reducing our ability to measure reliability accurately7. The current study aimed to obtain 
data from a type of sample that is comparable to the studies reported in the literature. It was 
not the focus of this study to investigate how more/ less homogenous sample influences the 
differential validity and if it affects the variance of the n–2 repetition cost, but this remains an 
                                                            
7 We are grateful to an anonymous review for suggesting we discuss this.  
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interesting question for future research. However, based on observations from the current and 
previous studies, even in a sample as homogenous as university students, there is 
considerable variance of the n–2 repetition cost (e.g. Grange & Juvina, 2015; see also Figure 
4 in the current paper). 
 
N–2 Repetition Cost & Inhibition 
The current study has suggested that the n–2 repetition cost has low reliability. Also, 
the inter-correlations of the n–2 repetition cost between the three task switching paradigms 
were low. These data are consistent with the notion that the n–2 repetition cost is not a stable 
measure of inhibitory control. However, these data are also to be expected if the n–2 
repetition cost is not a “pure” measure of inhibition; that is, if the n–2 repetition cost arises as 
a consequence of a mixture of factors—one of which being inhibition—then it is little wonder 
the reliability is low.  
There is some evidence that the n–2 repetition cost is not a pure measure of inhibition.  
We have recently provided evidence that interference during episodic retrieval can affect the 
magnitude of the n–2 repetition cost (Grange, Kowalczyk, & O’Loughlin, 2015; see also 
Mayr, 2002; Neill, 1997). This evidence comes from a close replication of Mayr (2002). In 
his study, Mayr suggested that the n–2 repetition cost could be influenced by episodic 
retrieval in the following way. When a given task is performed, an episodic trace of the trial’s 
parameters (such as the cue, the stimulus characteristics, and the response made) is stored in 
memory. When this task is cued again (i.e., task A in an ABA sequence), retrieval of the most 
recent episodic trace of this task (from n–2) occurs. If parameters of the current trial differ 
from that of the retrieved episode (e.g., a different response is required), interference occurs 
between the current trial parameters and the parameters contained within the retrieved trace. 
This can result in an n–2 repetition cost in the absence of any inhibitory mechanism.  
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Mayr (2002) developed a paradigm that controlled whether trial parameters matched 
or mismatched across an ABA sequence; he found that the n–2 repetition cost was not 
significantly modulated by episodic retrieval. In our close replication (Grange et al., 2015)—
with a larger sample size—we found a strong reduction in the n–2 repetition cost (almost 
half) when controlling for episodic retrieval. That is, we found evidence that if episodic 
retrieval is not taken into consideration, the estimate of the n–2 repetition cost can be 
inaccurate.  
Related to the current study, one possibility is that the low reliability of the n–2 
repetition cost is due to it being a contaminated measure (inhibition plus episodic retrieval). 
That is, we cannot be certain how much of the variance seen in the n–2 repetition cost in our 
data is due to episodic retrieval effects. It is likely that not controlling for episodic retrieval 
affected the reliability of the n–2 repetition cost as well as the inter-correlations between the 
three paradigms. There is already some evidence (Gade, Souza, Druey, & Oberauer, 2016) 
that an analogous effect to the n–2 repetition cost present in declarative working memory 
tasks—the n–2 list repetition cost—seems to be modulated by episodic retrieval effects. With 
the mentioned studies in mind, our ongoing research is investigating whether reliability of the 
n–2 repetition cost is influenced by episodic retrieval effects. 
Conclusion 
 Our data suggest the n–2 repetition cost is not reliable as a measure of individual 
differences in inhibitory control. Individual differences such as tendency to ruminate and 
processing speed did not predict the n–2 repetition cost. Taken together, these results show 
that the n–2 repetition cost as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control should 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the trial structure for each of the task switching paradigms. 
Note the images are not to scale. 
Figure 2. Density functions of the response time (RT) n–2 repetition cost distribution for 
each paradigm, calculated as RT (ABA) – RT (CBA). 
 
Figure 3. Density functions of the accuracy n–2 repetition cost distribution for each 
paradigm, calculated as % Accuracy (ABA) – % Accuracy (CBA). 
 
Figure 4. Reliability checks for the n–2 repetition cost for response times. The plots 
show violin plots of the (uncorrected) bootstrapped split-half reliability estimates (correlation 
coefficients, r) each paradigm. The horizontal dashed line represents the criteria for reliability 
(r ≈.5385; Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle & Condon, 2014). 
 
Figure 5. Reliability checks for the n–2 repetition cost for accuracy. The plots show violin 
plots of the (uncorrected) bootstrapped split-half reliability estimates (correlation coefficients, 
r) each paradigm. The horizontal dashed line represents the criteria for reliability (r ≈.5385; 
Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle & Condon, 2014). 
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Table 1. Mean response times (in milliseconds) and accuracy (in percent) for ABA and CBA 
sequences for each paradigm. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The n–2 repetition 
cost is calculated as ABA – CBA for both response time and accuracy. Note that for accuracy 
a negative n–2 repetition cost reflects poorer accuracy on ABA trials. 
 Response Times   Accuracy   N–2 repetition cost 
Paradigm ABA CBA  ABA CBA  RT Accuracy 








 91 -.92 








 105 -.33 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix for the mean response times from the three task switching tests, 
individual differences, age, sex, and the break (gap) between the two experimental sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS Processing Age Sex Gap
Numeric —        
Target 
      
.64** 
—       
Visual 
      
.75** 
      
.68** 
—      
RRS   .02   .10     .19 —     
Processing 
       -
.49** 
     -
.63** 
      -
.49** 
-.08 —    
Age    .35*     .25*      .30* -.02 -.21 —   
Sex  .06   .14    .03 -.21 -.21  .11 —  
Gap  .02  -.03 
          -
.05 
 .12 -.02 -.13 .19 — 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for the mean overall accuracy from the three task switching tests, 
individual differences, age, sex, and the break (gap) between the two experimental sessions. 
Numeric Target Visual RRS Processing Age Sex Gap 
Numeric -
Target  .42** - 
Visual  .50**  .63** - 
RRS  .14  .27*  .22 - 
Processing  .05  .08 -.07 -.08 - 
Age -.04  .07  .01 -.02 -.21 - 
Sex -.08 -.13  .02 -.21 -.21  .11 - 
Gap  -.17  .12  .01  .12 -.02 -.13 .19 - 
Note: **p<.0018 (Bonferroni-corrected criterion for significance). *p<.05 
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Table 4. Summary of multiple regression analyses for the n–2 repetition cost as the 
dependent variable and the processing speed and RRS scores ad independent variables. 
  t p β F df p adj.R2 












    
Processing  .14 .90   .11     
Overall 
model 











    
Processing -.74 .46 -.68     
Overall 
model 











    
Processing   -1.13 .26  -1.45     
Overall 
model 
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Table 5. Correlation matrix for the n–2 repetition cost in response times from the three task 
switching tests, individual differences, age, sex, and the break (gap) between the two 
experimental sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS Processing Age Sex Gap
Numeric —        
Target    .25* —       
Visual    .30*   .07 —      
RRS  .15   .01   .12 —     
Processing        -.15   .02  -.10 -.08 —    
Age  .14 -.10  -.02 -.02 -.21 —   
Sex  .06 -.04  -.05 -.21 -.21  .11 —  
Gap  .09  .07    .17  .12 -.02 -.13 .19 — 
Note: **p<.0018 (Bonferroni-corrected criterion for significance). *p<.05  
With equal number of trials in each paradigm there was only one significant correlation: the 
n–2 repetition cost between the Visual Judgment and the Numeric Judgment Paradigm, r(71) 
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Table 6. Correlation matrix for the n–2 repetition cost in accuracy from the three task 
switching tests, individual differences, age, sex, and the break (gap) between the two 
experimental sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS Processing Age Sex Gap
Numeric —        
Target .06 —       
Visual         .01 
      -
.15 
—      
RRS .16 .00 
        -
.03 
—     
Processing        .02 
      -
.06 
.00 -.08 —    
Age       -.09 
      -
.07 
 .11 -.02 -.21 —   
Sex       -.18 
      -
.08 
 -.10 -.21 -.21  .11 —  
Gap       -.08 
       
.07 
         -
.10 
 .12 -.02 -.13 .19 — 
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